Last post, we said goodbye to Chief Justice John Jay. He resigned from the Court because he was elected Governor of New York.¹ Bigger fish to fry, I guess.

So, who took the Chief Justice’s chair? Was it Justice James Iredell, the intellectual Justice who’s been sitting on the Supreme Court bench since day one? Was it Justice James Wilson, the well studied professor? How about Justice William Paterson, the bright newcomer to the bench?

To maybe everybody’s surprise, President Washington appointed somebody who previously resigned from the Court to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

His name is John Rutledge. He was previously a Supreme Court Justice before he resigned after sitting for precisely 0 Supreme Court meetings.² Yeah, President Washington first appointed this guy to the Court in 1789, and he resigned in 1791, all without joining his fellow Justices in Philadelphia…ever.³ That’s why we haven’t talked about him before.

Why did Rutledge resign back in 1791? Apparently he was disappointed he wasn’t offered the job of Chief Justice.⁴ Moreover, after taking the job on the Supreme Court, he was offered a position as chief justice of South Carolina’s Supreme Court, which was apparently more lucrative.⁵

So this man had a pretty unremarkable tenure as an Associate Justice, and he resigned before the Supreme Court really got going.

Imagine my surprise upon learning that it was this guy, John Rutledge, somebody who already resigned from the Court, who secured an appointment to the position of Chief Justice.

How did Rutledge get the job? Well, he heard John Jay was elected Governor of New York and saw an opportunity to shoot his shot.

The Most Audacious Job Application in Supreme Court History

Rutledge sent a letter to President Washington basically saying he was available and willing to take Jay’s seat, if it was up for grabs.

Specifically, Rutledge wrote, “I take the Liberty of intimating to you, privately, that, if [Jay] shall [resign], I have no Objection to take the place which he holds, if you think me as fit as any other person, & have not made Choice of one to succeed him: in either of which Cases, I could not expect, nor would I wish for, it.”⁶

You’d think Rutledge stopped there, but he did not. You won’t believe the audacity of this man.

Rather than simply telling Washington he was available for the job, he went on to tell President Washington that he and his friends were pissed that Washington appointed Jay instead of him, because Jay is dumber and less experienced.

Rutledge writes,

“Several of my friends were displeased at my accepting the Office of an Associate Judge, (altho’ the senior,) of the Supreme Court, of the United States, conceiving, (as I thought, very justly,) that my Pretensions to the Office of Chief Justice were, at least, equal to Mr Jay’s, in point of Law-Knowledge, with the Additional Weight, of much longer Experience, & much greater Practice—I was not, however, so partial, to myself, as, not to think, that you had very sufficient Reasons, for preferring him to any other, tho’, I, certainly, would not have taken the Commission, but, for your very friendly & polite, Letter, which accompanied it…”⁷

John Rutledge

I guess the ego worked. President Washington appointed John Rutledge to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.⁸ Rutledge was a recess appointment, meaning he was a temporary fill-in until the Senate could officially confirm, or approve, his appointment, which would lock him in for that sweet lifetime tenure.

The Senate couldn’t approve him right away because they were on vacation.⁹

Will he get the permanent appointment?

We’ll look at the dramatic end of Rutledge’s story in our next post.

For now, with Jay vending hot dogs in New York and Rutledge subbed in as Chief Justice, let’s turn to US. v. Peters.

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This is an admiralty case coming out of Pennsylvania.

Petitioner: Samuel B. Davis, who captured a ship on the high seas belonging to Philadelphian merchant James Yard.¹⁰

Respondent: District Judge Richard Peters, the unfortunate judge who got stuck dealing with Yard’s case.

This case was decided during the Washington Presidency. It is the first case of the Rutledge Court.

The Court ultimately ruled in favor of Davis, granting his motion for prohibition.

See the Court’s opinion here.

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It’s like this.

A Pennsylvanian merchant named James Yard was sailing his ship bearing flour and rum across the Caribbean when the ship was attacked.¹¹

The culprit? An American named Samuel Davis, commander of the Cassius. If you asked Davis, he was sailing under French authority.¹² If you asked Yard, Davis was only posing as French.¹³ Yard also alleged that the Cassius was armed illegally.¹⁴

In any event, Davis hauled Yard’s boat to the French island which would become Haiti, where it remained.¹⁵

Unfortunately for James Yard, he had nowhere to turn. His ship was captured in international waters and taken to the French island. The U.S. has no jurisdiction over such a far-flung matter.

But James Yard saw an opportunity to get relief in the U.S. when his nemesis arrived in Philadelphia with the Cassius, the damned boat that captured his.¹⁶ Because Davis and the offending boat were in Philly, Yard figured this was his chance. He filed an action in the District Court of Pennsylvania against Davis.¹⁷ Now I got you.

Specifically, Yard asked the District Court of Pennsylvania to seize the Cassius, to arrest David, and to compel Davis to pay up for his beloved ship and all it was carrying.¹⁸

The judge with the fortune to hear Yard’s case was District Court Judge Richard Peters.

Stop Right There

So there Davis was, not looking for trouble, just dropping by Philly to grab a cheesesteak, when suddenly he’s hit in the head with this litigation for something he did in the Caribbean.

Intent on stopping this madness, Davis filed a motion for a prohibition with the Supreme Court.¹⁹ As relevant to this case, a motion for a prohibition is when a party asks a higher court to stop a lower court from doing something.

A motion for a prohibition is a “preventative remedy” intended to stop the bad behavior before the litigation concludes.²⁰

Here, Davis argued that the District Court of Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction over his case because, by both treaty and international law, it was understood that France had jurisdiction over captures brought into its ports.²¹

The Arguments

Davis had a couple of lawyers. One of them was Alexander Dallas, the guy who wrote the official record of this case.²²

The question posed by the case was:

Can the district court hear a case about a capture made by a French ship in international waters, when the captured ship wasn’t brought within the United States, but instead was brought to French territory?

Davis argued:

1. The district court has no jurisdiction. International law says “the right of judging is vested in the courts of the captor.”²³ And so does the treaty between the United States and France.²⁴ The captor ship is French, so the French are the ones to hear this case, not the District Court of Pennsylvania.²⁵
2. We can’t just let Americans seize ships that pull up to their ports because of beef that may or may not have happened at sea. That’s a recipe for chaos in international relations.²⁶

Now get this. After David made his argument, Yard’s lawyers interrupted to say they received documents from the French, stating the French ruled on the case about Yard’s boat. Therefore, Yard’s lawyers said Yard would drop his lawsuit in the States once he confirmed what the result was.²⁷

So the Court went home for dinner, expecting some clarity the following day.²⁸

Well, the parties reconvened the next day and Yard’s lawyers didn’t quite have the clarity they were hoping for because the documents weren’t fully translated from French to English.²⁹ Should’ve taken French in school!

Although Yard likely wished for more time, he could delay no longer. He had to proceed with his counter-arguments.

Yard argued:

1. The district court has jurisdiction here. Even though my ship was captured in international waters and hauled off to a French island, the district court should still be able to hear this case because Davis is an American citizen, and he also had his ship outfitted with weapons in Philadelphia.³⁰ That’s enough connection with the U.S. to justify the U.S. stepping in here.

The Court considered adjourning, or postponing, their decision while it awaited a fuller translation of whatever the hell France sent Yard, but ultimately the Court issued its majority opinion.³¹ Perhaps Chief Justice John Rutledge was eager to finally put his name on a Supreme Court decision. He wrote the majority opinion.³²

The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Rutledge)

Speaking on behalf of the majority of the Court, Chief Justice Rutledge declares, “Let a prohibition issue.”³³

Indeed, the majority of the Court sides with Davis, agreeing that an American court cannot hear a case about a capture made by a French ship in international waters when the prize was brought into French territory.

Chief Justice Rutledge wrote his opinion as a letter to Pennsylvania District Court Judge Richard Peters, making explicitly clear that his court did not have jurisdiction to hear Yard’s case. Rather, France did.³⁴

The death-nail for Yard? Chief Justice Rutledge writes, “James Yard not in any manner alleging or articulating, that the said capture was made, within the territory, rivers or bays of the United States, or within a marine league of the coast thereof…”³⁵

The problem with Yard’s case, says Rutledge, is Yard doesn’t even allege his ship was captured in American territory. Rather, Yard concedes his ship was captured in French territory. Therefore, the American courts definitely don’t have jurisdiction to hear Yard’s case. The argument that Davis armed his ship in Philly and is an American wasn’t enough to establish jurisdiction here.

Rather than simply handing Yard an L on procedural grounds and moving on (as I think John Jay would have done) Chief Justice Rutledge brutalizes Yard’s suit as dangerous.

He skewers Yard, writing, “James Yard [filed this lawsuit]…in contempt of the government of the United States, against the laws of nations, and the treaties subsisting between the United States and the French Republic, and against the laws and customs of the United States; to the manifest violation of the law of nations and treaties, and to the manifest disturbance of the peace and harmony happily subsisting between the United States and the French Republic.”³⁶

That’s brutal.

Chief Justice Rutledge concludes by explicitly telling Judge Peters, don’t do another thing with this case. He commands, “You, therefore, are hereby prohibited, that you no further hold the plea aforesaid…which may be in any wise to the prejudice of the said Samuel B. Davis, or the said corvette or vessel of war, called the Cassius; or in contempt of the laws of the United States… from all proceedings thereon, you do, without delay, release the said Samuel B. Davis, and the said corvette or vessel of war, called the Cassius, at your peril…”³⁷

Understood, loud and clear!

Final Reflections

Why was Chief Justice Rutledge so emphatic in his language, attributing contempt to Yard and urging Judge Peters to abide by the Court’s order?

My conclusion? I think Chief Justice Rutledge writes like a madman here because he sees Yard’s suit as a ticking time bomb threatening to blow up the United States’ relationship with France.

In his own words, Chief Justice Rutledge expresses that Yard’s suit is a “manifest disturbance of the peace and harmony happily subsisting between the United States and the French Republic.”

I think Chief Justice Rutledge felt it was really important for the Court to set clear boundaries between which kinds of cases the U.S. was empowered to hear, and which kinds of cases France was empowered to hear. The only way for the Court to do that was to clarify the legal limits of Americans federal courts — lest the relationship between the U.S. and France be strained to a breaking point. Bad precedent could certainly disturb the harmony between the nations.

What we’re left with is two extremes, which are helpful for setting the boundaries for admiralty law jurisdiction.

One year prior to this case, the Court decided Glass v. The Sloop Betsey (1794), which stands for the proposition that American federal courts can hear a prize case when the captured boat is brought to American territory.

Here, in US v. Peters (1975), we get a ruling affirming the inverse: Foreign courts can hear a prize case when the captured boat is brought to foreign shores.

So, when we combine the rules from Glass and Peters, we get a clear rule: Generally, when a ship is captured in international waters, the country whose courts get to hear the case is the country whose port the captured vessel is first brought into.

While we might not too much care about these rules themselves, (I don’t know how many of us are sailing ships on the high seas) I think this case provides a fascinating look at a panicked Justice practically hyperventilating through his opinion in a desperate effort to avert an international incident, lest the French be displeased with American table manners.

Way to make an entrance, Rutledge.

You Be The Judge

What do you think of this case? Leave a comment!

Studying this case for class? I offer 1-on-1, virtual law school tutoring. Learn more here.

Here’s a Bluebook cite for ya – Johnathan J. Azar, When the Supreme Court Averted an International Incident: United States v. Peters (1795) (July 21, 2026)

FOOTNOTES

1. John Jay, Historical Society of the New York Courts, https://history.nycourts.gov/figure/john-jay/ (last visited July 21, 2026) ↩︎
2. John Rutledge to George Washington (Mar. 5, 1791), Founders Online, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-0290 (last visited July 21, 2026). ↩︎
3. Id. ↩︎
4. Id. ↩︎
5. Id. ↩︎
6. John Rutledge to George Washington (June 12, 1795), Founders Online, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-18-02-0165 (last visited July 21, 2026). ↩︎
7. Id. ↩︎
8. History of the Court: The Rutledge Court, 1795, Supreme Court Historical Society, https://supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courts/rutledge-court-1795/ (last visited July 21, 2026). ↩︎
9. List of All Sessions, Hist., Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Session-Dates/All/ (last visited July 21, 2026). ↩︎
10. Writs of prohibition are issued in the sovereign’s name, so the U.S. is designated as the petitioner in the case’s caption. Russel T. Walker, Prohibition—Is the Writ of Prohibition a Prerogative Writ?, Abstract, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 789 (1939). ↩︎
11. United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 121 (1795); Yard was a prevalent merchant. He did business with guys like James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and James Monroe, to name a few. James Yard to James Madison (Sept. 9, 1796), in 16 The Papers of James Madison 395 (J.C.A. Stagg, Thomas A. Mason & Jeanne K. Sisson eds., 1989), reprinted in Founders Online, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-16-02-0256; James Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 30, 1794), in 15 The Papers of James Madison 398 (Thomas A. Mason, Robert A. Rutland & Jeanne K. Sisson eds., 1985), reprinted in Founders Online, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0304 ↩︎
12. Id. at 121-122 ↩︎
13. Id. ↩︎
14. Id. ↩︎
15. Id. at 122 ↩︎
16. Id. ↩︎
17. Id. ↩︎
18. Id. ↩︎
19. Id. at 125 ↩︎
20. Id. at note 1 ↩︎
21. Id. at 122-123 ↩︎
22. Id. at 125 ↩︎
23. Id. at 126 ↩︎
24. Id. ↩︎
25. Id. at 127 ↩︎
26. Id. at 127-128 ↩︎
27. Id. at 128-129 ↩︎
28. Id. at 129 ↩︎
29. Id. ↩︎
30. Id. at 131 ↩︎
31. Id. ↩︎
32. Id. ↩︎
33. Id. ↩︎
34. Id. at 129-130 ↩︎
35. Id. at 130 ↩︎
36. Id. at 131 (emphasis added) ↩︎
37. Id. at 132 ↩︎

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