The merchant Samuel Brailsford sold James Spalding some goods, but didn’t get paid for them, so Spalding owed Brailsford a debt.

At least, that’s the narrative peddled in our textbooks. Nobody bothers to mention that the “goods” Brailsford sold Spalding were slaves.

Not the Supreme Court, not Wikipedia, not most of the authoritative sources on the background of this case.

Even the lauded Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States makes only a fleeting mention, in one footnote, that the debt underpinning this whole case is for — their words, not mine — a “cargo of negroes.”¹

Yes, this debt dispute that made its way to the Supreme Court was over blood money, and there’s not a whisper of that fact in our official government records.

That sends chills down my spine.

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This is a collections case coming out of Georgia.

Petitioner: The State of Georgia, which argued it was entitled to be paid for the debt.

Respondent(s): A bunch of slave merchants, including British slave merchant Samuel Brailsford, his South Carolinian partners Robert William Powell and John Hopton, and Georgian merchant James Spalding.

This case went to the Jay Court during the Washington Presidency. The Court ultimately granted Georgia’s injunction to freeze payment of the disputed debt, allowing the parties time to fight out who was entitled to it.

See the Court’s opinion here.

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It’s like this.

In 1774, James Spalding put up a bond, or a written promise to pay money, for the slaves Brailsford sold him.²

But when the Brit Brailsford tried to collect the debt from Spalding in 1790, there was a problem: the State of Georgia said it was entitled to be paid the debt, not Brailsford, because of Georgia’s wartime law that made all debts owed to the British payable to the State instead.³

During the Revolutionary War, the States needed money to fund the fight. One way to raise money while punching Britain in the nose was to sequester, or seize, debts owed to any British creditors.⁴

What this means is some States passed laws which effectively told Americans, “Do you owe a debt to a Brit? Well, we’re at war with those guys, and we don’t really want you to pay them. Pay us instead (you don’t have a choice), and when you’ve paid off your debt, you’ll be free and clear.”⁵

Diabolical, right?

But after the Revolutionary War came to an end, the United States realized it had to chill. To give the British confidence that the U.S. would play nice going forward, the U.S. agreed to sign the 1783 Treaty of Peace, which included a term stating both sides could collect their debts.⁶

The States didn’t really like that part of the Treaty. Consequently, during that weird grey period between 1783 and the summer of 1788, before the Constitution was finally ratified, any foreign creditor who tried to get paid for a debt had no luck in State court.⁷ The States didn’t want to let go of the debts due to them under their sequestration laws, the Treaty of Peace be damned.

When the federal courts were finally formed, foreigners came in droves to enforce their rights to American debts because, presumably, the federal courts would be more impartial than the State courts, which seemed eager to (metaphorically) defenestrate the British (meaning, to throw them out of windows).⁸

Georgia had a sequestration law on the books, so in 1790, when this limey Brailsford sued Spalding, a Georgian, for the debt, the State of Georgia stepped in, maintaining it was entitled to be paid the debt.⁹

It’s easy to see why. Spalding’s debt wasn’t small. His bond was valued at over £7,000 pounds. In today’s (2026) money, that’s somewhere between $897,000 to $1,840,000.¹⁰ How many slaves must that have been?

The Devil Went Down to Georgia

Brailsford took his claim against Spalding to Georgia’s Circuit Court.

There, “Georgia tried to interplead itself as the true plaintiff…”¹² In other words, Georgia tried to insert itself into the lawsuit between Brailsford and Spalding, intent on stepping into Brailsford’s shoes as the rightful creditor.

One of the judges hearing Brailsford v. Spalding in the Circuit Court was Supreme Court Justice Iredell, who was in Georgia fulfilling his responsibility of riding the circuit, or traveling to hear cases throughout the nation, not just those which landed at the Supreme Court.¹³

The Circuit Court denied Georgia’s petition to join in.¹⁴ Justice Iredell ruled this way because (1) he believed if Georgia became a party to the lawsuit, only the Supreme Court could hear the case, because only the Supreme Court was allowed to hear cases where a State is a party; and (2) he believed the procedural act of interpleading was only allowed in a suit in equity.¹⁵

So the case between Brailsford and Spalding proceeded in Georgia’s Circuit Court, without Georgia as a party. Ultimately, the Circuit Court ruled for Brailsford, stating he was entitled to collect his debt, and ordering Spalding to pay up.¹⁶

Georgia wasn’t going to let the debt go. Racing against the clock, Georgia sharpened its knife and lunged for Brailsford in the U.S. Supreme Court, desperate for vindication before Spalding could pay his debt.¹⁷

Georgia was able to go directly to the Supreme Court with this issue because the Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction where a State is a party.¹⁸

The Constitution spells out the kinds of cases a party can bring directly to the Supreme Court.

If you look at Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, you’ll see that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over:

1. Cases impacting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls; and
2. Cases where a State is a Party.¹⁹

Otherwise, if a party wants to go before the Supreme Court, she needs to work her way up through the lower courts first through appeal. Cases that make it to the Supreme Court that way are called appellate cases. When the Court hears those cases, they are exercising appellate jurisdiction.²⁰

Georgia v. Brailsford I: The Arguments

The State of Georgia went to the Supreme Court asking for an injunction. An injunction is a remedy that compels a party to do or to stop doing something. In this case, Georgia wanted the Court to stop Spalding from paying his debt to Brailsford. Georgia wanted that money, damn it!

Georgia argued:

1. We passed a law saying any debts Americans owed to the British were supposed to be paid to us. Spalding is a Georgian. He owes money to a British guy. Therefore, by our laws, we stand in the shoes of the British guy, and Spalding has to pay us. We have a right to collect the debt.²¹
2. The peace treaty between the US and Britain doesn’t take away our right to collect the debt.²²
3. Our Circuit Court didn’t even let us be heard (I see you sitting there, Iredell…)²³
4. All of these guys are trying to defraud Georgia.²⁴
5. We need the court to grant us an injunction because we don’t have any other adequate remedy for this harm.²⁵

I’ve got to pause for a second to let you know about the lawyer repping the State of Georgia. The guy who argued on behalf of the State, Alexander Dallas, is the Supreme Court’s first court reporter.²⁶

Look at my footnotes below. Do you see that there in bold?: Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 403 (1792).

That “Dall” refers to the freakin author of the U.S. Reports, who in this case is the same guy who happens to be arguing for the State of Georgia, Alexander Dallas.

This means the U.S. government’s official record of this case and decision was written by the petitioner’s lawyer. I don’t know, man. Seems wrong to me.

Back to the arguments.

The slave merchants argued:

1. Georgia doesn’t have any right to this debt. They didn’t even go through the proper procedure to confiscate it!²⁷
2. This is an A and B conversation between Brailsford and Spalding. C your way out of it!²⁸

The Opinions

The Court ruled to grant Georgia an injunction to pause collection of the debt.

The split was 4-2 for Georgia, meaning 4 Justices ruled in favor of the State of Georgia, and 2 Justices ruled in favor of Brailsford and company.

Each Justice wrote his own opinion.

Majority Opinions:

Justice Iredell

Justice Iredell begins his opinion by assuring the parties that although he heard Brailsford v. Spalding in the lower court, he is giving his opinion on this matter “detached from every previous consideration of the merits of the cause.”²⁹ (Okay, buddy.)

He explains that Georgia’s Circuit Court (on which he sat) could not let Georgia into Brailsford v. Spalding because the Constitution says the Supreme Court has dibs on cases involving a State.³⁰ So the lower court’s hands (his hands) were tied.³¹

Judge Iredell therefore reasons that because the State of Georgia was previously not allowed to have a forum, “Every principle of law, justice and honor…seem to require[] that the claim of the state of Georgia should not be…decided or defeated, by a judgment pronounced between parties, over whom she had no control…”³²

He argues that because the State of Georgia was finally and properly in the Supreme Court, and every party was present, the parties should be permitted to work out the issue.³³

Justice Iredell proclaims, “…justice will be done to Georgia, and an irreparable injury may be prevented while the adverse party, even if he ultimately succeeds, can only complain of a short delay…”³⁴

Justice Blair

Justice Blair cooly reasons nobody can be deprived of a right without being provided the opportunity to provide a defense.³⁵ He writes, “No right can be defeated, in law, unless the party claiming it has himself an opportunity to support it.”

Practical, Justice Blair explains the Court will have to issue an injunction to keep the money from moving while the parties hash out who is entitled to it.³⁶ As for the underlying dispute, Justice Blair says it is “too early[]to pronounce an opinion upon the titles in collision.”³⁷

Justice Wilson

Justice Wilson describes the State of Georgia asking for an injunction as “awkward and irregular.”³⁸ He thinks the State of Georgia should have filed a writ of error (the same kind of writ our friend General West of West v. Barnes tried to file with the Court) rather than asking for an injunction.³⁹

Nonetheless, Justice Wilson agrees to put a freeze on the money while the parties figure out who is entitled to the debt.⁴⁰

Chief Justice Jay

Chief Justice Jay concedes he was ready to rule for Brailsford, but was ultimately persuaded against doing so.⁴¹ He reasons that rather than dealing with ping-ponging the money back and forth, it may be most prudent to park it.⁴²

“For my part, I think, that the money should remain in the custody of the law, until the law has adjudged to whom it belongs; and therefore, I am content, that the injunction issue.”⁴³

Dissenting Opinions:

Justice Johnson

Justice Johnson is not persuaded that an injunction is warranted.⁴⁴ An injunction isn’t like Halloween candy. Not everybody can get some. There are requirements.

Justice Johnson explains a party can’t get an injunction unless (1) the party shows they have a good chance of winning the underlying case. (Here, that means the debt dispute); and (2) the party shows they have no other legal avenue through which he can get relief.⁴⁵ There are other requirements, too.

In his reasoning, Justice Johnson tips his hat to something Justice Wilson highlights in his opinion, which is the idea that Georgia could have filed a writ of error instead of asking for an injunction.⁴⁶

In sum, Georgia failed to convince Justice Johnson it met the requirements for an injunction.

Justice Cushing

Justice Cushing cites to the Judiciary Act of 1789 (General West’s favorite law), writing, “[S]uits in equity shall not be sustained, in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”⁴⁷

Justice Cushing argues the State of Georgia can sue Brailsford, “who is a man of fortune,” for the money.⁴⁸ There, no injunction needed.

He also expresses concerns that the Court getting involved here could result in Spalding being liable for the debt twice.⁴⁹

The Decision

Ultimately, the Court issued the injunction Georgia requested.

Now that the money was frozen, the Court would need to decide who was entitled to the pot of gold…

Final Reflections

The way I see it, the Justices in the majority emphasized fairness, hardship, and efficiency concerns, whereas the dissenting Justices engaged in something closer to technical legal analysis. While all of the above factors deserve consideration when making a decision, I am more persuaded by the dissenters.

An injunction is an extraordinary remedy that’s supposed to be granted only when money isn’t good enough to make things right, like in the case of a temporary restraining order, or where a business needs to be told to stop selling items that infringe on another’s trademark.

Here, the State of Georgia had other viable avenues aside from an injunction, right? I think Georgia could have gone after Brailsford to recover the debt after the money was paid out.

Doing so would probably be a procedural headache, which Chief Justice Jay alludes to, and maybe there’d be a risk of Brailsford fleeing to Britain, but is inconvenience and a hypothetical flight risk enough to warrant an injunction, which is supposed to be an option secondary to seeking monetary damages?

Maybe I’m wrong.

We can’t really engage in a full analysis here because the Justices don’t lay out the elements of the rule they are applying to the facts. Every first year law student knows that before diving into analysis, you have to tee up your rules. The Justices don’t do that here, so it’s difficult for an outside observer using the U.S. Reports to come to his own conclusion.

I’m more interested in hearing what you think.

Why I’m Fired Up

Can we take a minute to recognize how gross this case is?

It’s gross on two levels. First, you have a State brawling with a bunch of slave merchants for slave debt — not so the State can go ahead and put that money to a good cause, but because the State wants to replenish its coffers after a bloody war.

Second, we’re looking at a situation where a State is salivating at the prospect of stripping an individual of property that, really, belongs to that individual.

The fact that Brailsford is a slave merchant makes the deprivation of liberty easier to stomach, for sure, but aside from the who, I don’t like that a State could exercise the power to just go ahead and declare private debts are suddenly debts owed to the government.

Today, I think the Contracts Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause would stand in the way of such a law being enforced.

To be clear, I do understand the courts are not supposed to dispense justice based on who is before them. Quite the contrary. But being in the presence of these rotten characters for weeks has left my blood cold.

This concludes Georgia v. Brailsford I. As for part two — you’ll have to stick with us to learn how the Court addresses Georgia v. Brailsford II. This is Con Law, Chronologically, after all.

You Be The Judge

Have more to say? Leave a comment!

Studying this case for class? I offer 1-on-1, virtual law school tutoring. Learn more here.

Here’s a Bluebook cite for ya – Johnathan J. Azar, The Devil Went Down to Georgia: Georgia v. Brailsford I (1792) (Mar. 6, 2026) 

FOOTNOTES

1. Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, vol. 6, at 74 n.7 (Columbia Univ. Press 1998); Pierce Butler to Gideon Pendleton (Jan. 28, 1794), in Pierce Butler Letterbook (on file with ScU). ↩︎
2. Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 Yale L.J. 221 (2013). ↩︎
3. Id. ↩︎
4. Id. ↩︎
5. Id. at 221-222. ↩︎
6. Id. at 221; Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, reprinted in 12 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776–1949 8, 11 (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1974). ↩︎
7. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 Yale L.J. at 221. ↩︎
8. Id. ↩︎
9. Id. ↩︎
10. Lawrence H. Officer and Samuel H. Williamson, “Computing ‘Real Value’ Over Time With a Conversion Between U.K. Pounds and U.S. Dollars, 1791 to Present”, MeasuringWorth, 2026. ↩︎
11. The Abolition of the Slave Trade, Royal Museums Greenwich, https://www.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/rmgc-object-255183 (last visited Mar. 6, 2026). ↩︎
12. Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 Yale L.J. at 221-222. ↩︎
13. Id. at 222. ↩︎
14. Id. ↩︎
15. Id. ↩︎
16. Id. at 224. ↩︎
17. Documentary History, vol. 6, at 77-78. ↩︎
18. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. ↩︎
19. Id. ↩︎
20. Id. ↩︎
21. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 402-403 (1792). ↩︎
22. Documentary History, vol. 6, at 79. ↩︎
23. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 403 (1792). ↩︎
24. Id. at 404 ↩︎
25. Documentary History, vol. 6, at 79. ↩︎
26. Eli Pullman, Alexander Dallas, The Digital Encyclopedia of George Washington (Mount Vernon Ladies’ Ass’n), https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/alexander-dallas. ↩︎
27. Documentary History, vol. 6, at 79. ↩︎
28. Id. ↩︎
29. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 406 (1792). ↩︎
30. Id. ↩︎
31. Id. ↩︎
32. Id. ↩︎
33. Id. ↩︎
34. Id. ↩︎
35. Id. ↩︎
36. Id. at 407 ↩︎
37. Id. ↩︎
38. Id. ↩︎
39. Id. ↩︎
40. Id. ↩︎
41. Id. at 408 ↩︎
42. Id. ↩︎
43. Id. ↩︎
44. Id. at 404 ↩︎
45. Id. ↩︎
46. Id. ↩︎
47. Id. at 407; An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States (Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789), Avalon Project, Yale Law Sch. Lillian Goldman Law Libr., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/judiciary_act.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2026) (emphasis added). ↩︎
48. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). ↩︎
49. Id. ↩︎

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